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ABSTRACT
Distributed sensor networks such as IoT deployments gener-
ate large quantities of measurement data. Often, the analyt-
ics that runs on this data is available as a web service which
can be purchased for a fee. A major concern in the analytics
ecosystem is ensuring the security of the data. Often, com-
panies offer Information Rights Management (IRM) as a so-
lution to the problem of managing usage and access rights
of the data that transits administrative boundaries. IRM en-
ables individuals and corporations to create restricted IoT
data, which can have its flow from organisation to individ-
ual control – disabling copying, forwarding, and allowing
timed expiry. We describe our investigations into this func-
tionality and uncover a weak-spot in the architecture – its
dependence upon the accurate global availability of time.
We present an amplified denial-of-service attack which at-
tacks time synchronisation and could prevent all the users in
an organisation from reading any sort of restricted data until
their software has been re-installed and re-configured. We
argue that IRM systems built on current technology will be
too fragile for businesses to risk widespread use. We also
present defences that leverage the capabilities of Software-
Defined Networks to apply a simple filter-based approach to
detect and isolate attack traffic.
1. INTRODUCTION
Led by the intense desire to sense ubiquitously, measure
universally, and apply data analytics to sensed information
in the hope of adding value, governments, industry, society,
and the individual are hastily adopting the vision of the
Internet-of-everything. In the majority of cases the primary
aim is to collect data, apply analytics and sell the intel-
ligence gathered further on within the ecosystem. In the
case of industrial IoT systems, organisations hope to adopt
a data-driven approach towards managing, assessing and
verifying their business workflows. Manufacturing indus-
tries are keen to understand how coarse to very-fine grained
measurements about their processes can add value to their
bottom line; service industries are similarly interested in ob-
taining fine-grained measurements with the view of moving
from a periodic maintenance cycle to a predictive mainte-
nance cycle – i.e by using automated and sensed data-driven
approaches, firms believe they can predict when components
within a system are showing signs of failure. For instance,
a conventional lift requires periodic inspection and replace-
ment of parts which are most worthy of operation but that
must be replaced in order to achieve a working lift with
high probability until the next maintenance cycle (i.e. high
availability). However, such conventional models of periodic
maintenance schedules, tend to overestimate component
failures resulting in excess maintenance expenditure and
missing failures between maintenance cycles. On the other
hand, a data-driven approach where the lift is equipped
with speed, weight, cable tension, and shaft sensors, engen-
ders predictive failure models that promise better results
— machine learning techniques applied to the data streams
promise to detect problems as they unfold and prior to catas-
trophic component failure. Thus maintenance cycles can be
sparser thus saving money for the maintenance company.
Nice as these ideas are in theory there are some fun-
damental challenges with data management that arise in
IoT environments. To generate usable intelligence from
hyperconnected networks of sensors, the defender (network
operator) must collect the information at a centralised loca-
tion in order to run machine learning algorithms over their
data. A cloud storage option is a natural choice for such a
storage location. However, it isn’t always possible to run all
analytics in a single datacentre. In order to take advantage
of specialist analytics services, typical workflows require
IoT data to be sent across administrative boundaries. So
how does an organisation secure data that is stored beyond
the customer’s datacentre.
Microsoft provides a solution to the problem of managing
information rights over data that transfers across admin-
istrative boundaries such as data centres, cloud providers,
and managed analytics services. Microsoft proposes to
accomplish this using Azure Rights Management (RMS)
technology [7]. RMS can be used to manage IoT data from
any network or IoT hub as long as the data is stored on
an Azure cloud.
RMS hopes to make data behave like physical objects.
RMS ensures that the access control metadata placed on
IoT data is enforced on remote files, i.e. even if the data is
moved from its location on the cloud on to a specialist work-
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station, a different cloud or data centre, or copied to a data
storage that’s not under the control of an IT organisation.
RMS also promises audit and monitoring support to stored
data, for instance, the IoT network operator is notified
when a remotely located datafile is accessed, processed, or
moved to another location where this information can be
accessed by someone else.
While much attention within IoT security has been de-
voted to the analysis of security and privacy protocols for
inter-device and device-hub communication [9], much less
attention has been paid to Rights Management services
used by organisations to manage the huge amounts of data
that IoT deployments are expected to generate. Naturally,
the security of these rights management services is of crucial
importance. If the rights management can be compromised,
then at best the IoT network operator will lose control of
their data. Worse still, an attacker might deny access to
the IoT network operator itself, resulting in service-denial
attacks on the IoT infrastructure. This can have serious
consequences beyond the mere loss of data.
IoT based telemetry and monitoring drive modern safety
regimes where predictive analytics drives (reduced) mainte-
nance frequency and replace traditional maintenance cycles.
Without measurement data, the safety of the appliance or
system is at risk. Therefore, a denial of service attack on
IoT data can directly lead to a safety compromise. In other
words, a security attack translates into a safety problem.
In safety-critical applications, such as elevators, medical
device operation, or drug manufacturing, the absence of
maintenance information might require the appliance to
be shut down for safety reasons, with the possibility of
cascading failures further down the dependency chain.
With RMS, an attacker won’t need to find individual
device vulnerabilities to exploit. Instead, if the network
operators rights to their data can somehow be revoked or
suspended, then service denial attacks again RMS can be
generalised across IoT networks without attackers being
required to know, understand or exploit the devices and
their vulnerabilities within a target network. In this paper,
we propose service denial attacks on an IoT deployment
using the Azure Rights Management Service.
2. INFORMATIONRIGHTSMANAGEMENT
We introduce Digital Rights Management (DRM) as a
precursor to Information Rights Management, which is de-
rived from DRM, and discuss the successes and limitations
of both types of rights management.
DRM is a collection of technologies developed for restrict-
ing the use of hardware and copyrighted work. This includes
the control of access, modification and distribution of con-
tent, and the systems that enforce these policies [15]. It has
allowed for the prevention of unauthorised distribution of
copyrighted digital media, and DRM technologies have been
used in a variety of technologies including, but not limited
to: documents, film and music. DRM has also been used in
conjunction with other technologies, such as using steganog-
raphy to provide DRM control information over insecure
communication channels [16]. DRM can be generalised
into four components - digital rights to manage, encryption,
license management and a DRM-enabled client [12]. A
packaging server is used to distribute license data, domain
certificates and packaged content to other servers which
manage the different aspects of a DRM system. License
data is sent to a license server which is used to request and
issue licenses to DRM-enabled clients. Domain certificates
are registered with and issued by a domain controller to
the clients, and finally a distribution server (or multiple)
request and deliver the protected content to the clients.
Typically, DRM uses encryption which is applied to the
content to be protected, such that it can only be “unlocked”
with the correct key. Key exchange is a critical part of
DRM and requires a root of trust [13]. This involves the
distributor only providing the keys to software, services or
devices it trusts. The distribution of the keys can vary on
many factors including the device, the content and security
levels required. It can range from merely providing keys
to devices which share a correct token, to secret keys em-
bedded in the device used for pairing with advanced levels
of encryption. The primary advantage of DRM is that its
existence provides a level of assurance to the owner when
allowing the electronic distribution of their content.
IRM is derived from DRM and involves technologies that
protect sensitive information from unauthorised access. It
started as a feature that allowed users to control the flow
of email and office documents such as word-processed files
or spreadsheets and was expanded to include many other
types of data after 2010. While DRM is primarily used
to protect intellectual property from patent infringement
and piracy, IRM focuses on protecting sensitive data —
especially data that is exchanged with external entities
outside of its originating organisation. The main difference
between IRM and DRM is that a true IRM system sepa-
rates the information from its control such that either can
be accessed, manipulated and distributed separately [3].
IRM encrypts data and applies IRM rules which enforce
access policies to allow or deny specific activities, such as the
data being read-only or blocking any data from being copied
from a document. A client who is entitled to access the
sensitive data must first be registered with the IRM server.
After the user is authenticated, the server will download
some code to the client device. Every time the user requests
a new document from the server or accesses the existing
document(s) on their device, the code on the device must
reauthenticate on the IRM server. This allows for a key to
be downloaded which in turn, decrypts the document and
determines the access policies the client is entitled to. Some
IRM services allow for time-limited offline access privileges,
for example to those who want to peruse documents in
places with limited access to the Internet. The benefit to
IRM is that these enforced policies persist even when data is
sent externally, such that IRM sealed documents can remain
secure no matter where they are accessed. With this said,
IRM solutions require a client user to have specialised IRM
software installed on their device in order to access data
with IRM protection. For this reason, many organisations
limit the use of IRM protection to data that requires it.
Rights management and IoT:.
Bauer et al. stress the importance of data provenance
throughout the life-cycles of IoT devices to create a trusted
and secure IoT environment [4]. They suggest the use of
DRM technologies to control and validate sensitive meta in-
formation such as provenance data. Matthieu and Ramleth
propose an alternate the use of IRM for managing security
and access rights within an IoT context [14]. They pro-
pose a cross-domain messaging architecture for IoT devices,
where a remote analytics service performs computations
over data supplied by IoT deployments spanning adminis-
trative and organisation boundaries, whilst restricting the
use of the supplied data for the stated purpose. Huckle
et al. [10] identify how IoT and blockchain technologies
can use digital rights management to enable applications
that enforce usage rights in the physical world, such as
managing access rights to resources among tenants in a
shared home or within a holiday home.
2.1 Limitations
A disadvantage of DRM is that it does not guarantee
enforcement in any fundamental way – once an approve de-
vice has access to the data, a large number of side-channel
attacks can be mounted. Further, the restrictions can result
in a significant insult rate as the rights management sys-
tem tries to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
users [13]. While consumers may feel insulted at treated as
a potential pirate user, in a majority of cases, DRM does
not prevent data exfiltration and in turn, demonstrates a
lot of inconvenience to the consumers while attempting to
provide a theoretical level of protection to content distribu-
tors. As well as this, the extra costs of the development and
maintenance of DRM systems has sometimes meant that
paying customers had to spend more money to ultimately
receive a worse functioning product than a copy of the same
product that doesn’t use DRM. Although DRM covers the
protection of proprietary data; it does not effectively protect
the needs of an industrial (or enterprise) IoT deployment.
Therefore, an IoT deployment would need more appropriate
technology when it comes to protecting and sharing its sensi-
tive data. IRM concentrates on these needs and uses end-to-
end encryption to manage individual permissions and usage
rights. To this end, Furlong and Cookson proposed meth-
ods for managing rights access in a transparent manner [6],
with a balance between the fraud rate and the insult rate.
Like its predecessor, IRM also has limitations. It was
designed to not only manage access rights to data but also
control the interactions of the consumers of the data to
enforce some of these rights. However, IRM cannot prevent
side-channel attacks. For instance, anyone capturing a pho-
tograph of the data once it has been accessed and displayed
on a device. IRM also disallows the use of built-in snapshot
features to prevent digital capture from the same device, but
with the constant advance in technology, however, it is prac-
tically impossible for IRM systems to prevent third-party
software from capturing snapshots. Further, IRM does not
prevent data-exfiltration attacks by malware. If an attacker
has stolen the credentials of someone who has legitimate ac-
cess to IRM-protected data, an IRM system has no ability to
prevent the data being accessed by the attacker. Aside from
attackers, IRM cannot prevent domain administrators from
accessing the data - which suggests that on an internal level
within an organisation using IRM protection for its data,
there must be a higher level of assurance with technical staff.
2.2 Availability Attacks on DRM Systems
Previous work has noted the need for scalability and
resilience of online DRM service components. Federrath [5]
and Arnab et al. [2] note that DRM systems require authen-
tication with an online rights management server and high-
light the need for scalable server-side DRM components [11,
8]. If this server suffers from an outage then legitimate con-
sumers of the DRM system will be unable to access the data
protected by the DRM system. Much more recently, Zhang
conducted a survey[17] report that the use of DRM in partic-
ular Ubisoft applications resulted in legitimate users being
denied access due to a severe outage to the Ubisoft DRM.
All these works point to the need for a scalable or global-
scale architectures for DRM deployment that can withstand
the challenges of servicing DRM clients. With the advent
of IoT, the challenge becomes even more start — Can dig-
ital rights management technology offer the super-scaled
architectures required by upcoming IoT deployments?
3. ARCHITECTURE
Azure Rights Management (RMS) is a cloud-based ser-
vice which can be used to control the flow of data from
devices to the cloud, such that authorised IoT devices and
related services can send, receive and manipulate the data,
while others are denied access. Before data is sent to the
cloud, it is encrypted on the device at the application level,
with a policy which defines authorised use of the data. Some
IoT devices may already have several policies pre-packaged
with the device, dependant on the nature of its use. The
policy is typically used to restrict the readability of the
data, and restrict copying and editing only to other devices,
organisations and services stated in the policy. When the
protected data is accessed by a legitimate user, organisa-
tion or an authorised service, the data is decrypted, and
the policy attached to the data enforce the rights for that
authorised entity.
3.1 Protecting Data on an IoT Device
An RMS client on the IoT device will initially connect to
the Azure RMS service which authenticates the device using
an Azure Active Directory account. When connected, the
authentication is automatic, and the device is not prompted
for credentials. After authentication, the connection is then
redirected to the organisation’s Azure Information Protec-
tion tenant. This issues certificates to let the device authen-
ticate to the RMS service, allowing it to protect content of-
fline. The certificates are valid for 31 days provided that the
device account is still enabled in the Azure Active Directory.
When protecting data, the RMS client on the device cre-
ates a random content key and encrypts the data using the
key with AES encryption. The encryption is used for generic
protection and native protection when the file is a protected
pdf, text or image file (.ppdf, .ptxt and .pjpg respectively).
The client then creates a certificate which includes a policy
which defines the rights and restrictions of the data, such as
an expiration date. The RMS client on the device uses the
organisation’s key, which was obtained during the initial-
isation period for the device, to encrypt the policy and the
content key. During this time, the RMS client also signs the
policy with the certificate already on the device from ini-
tialisation. Finally, the client embeds the policy within the
encrypted data, allowing the data to be stored and shared
anywhere through any means of storage and transmission.
Figure 1: Azure RMS IoT Architecture Dia-
gram [1]
3.2 Accessing RMS-Protected Data
When an authorised entity, such as those performing
predictive analysis, wants to access the time-expiring data,
the RMS client attached to the service sends the encrypted
policy and certificates to the Azure Rights Management
Service. The service decrypts and evaluates the policy such
that a list of rights is obtained specific to the service. The
content key is extracted from the decrypted policy and is
then encrypted with the RMS client’s public RSA key ob-
tained with the request. The content key is then embedded
into a use license with the user rights and is returned to
the RMS client. Finally, the RMS client attached to the
predictive analysis service receives the encrypted use license
and decrypts it using its private key, which also, in turn,
decrypts the rights list which is enforced when the data is
accessed. The predictive analysis service can use the data
in many ways, such as running machine and deep learning
on the data to learn and make relevant intelligent decisions.
4. DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS
During initial experiments with Azure’s IRM system (i.e.
RMS) it was discovered that changing the clock on the
RMS client resulted in it experiencing stability problems.
In particular, when the time on the client was moved for-
ward by 2 hours the RMS client system crashed and no
applications could view or create IRM protected documents.
The only workable way to recover was to re-install the RMS
system on the client and reboot. We hypothesise that the
reason the RMS crashed was related to the behaviour of
such protection measures, and some form of time-shifting
protection would continue to be necessary in future versions
of the Azure RMS client software. To confirm the hypoth-
esis, we repeated the exercise 25 times. The client crashed
on all 25 repetitions giving us confidence that the RMS
client crash has a causal link to the time shift. To confirm
with 100% confidence we would ideally require access to
the client source code, however it is closed source at the
time of writing this paper.
This observation caused us to investigate the reliance
of the RMS client system on synchronized, stable and se-
cure time. It is reasonable to expect that future versions
of client could stop changes in system time resulting in
client becoming unusable. However, since RMS permits
time-limited data, it was clear that there may be more
fundamental dependencies on system time.
The (Azure) RMS client does not need to be connected
to the RMS server in order to read RMS protected data,
since the client caches keys locally and uses these when the
server cannot be contacted. If, once granted, the right to
read a document cannot be revoked then this local caching
would not be a problem, however in the case of time-limited
documents the client must be responsible for correctly ex-
piring keys and re-requesting them from the server. An
obvious way of bypassing the RMS time-limitation restric-
tions is for a client to initially open a document within the
time period that they are permitted to have access, so as
to obtain a key. Then by manipulating the local clock, we
prevented this key from expiring and so continuing to have
access of the document, even after the time their access
should have been revoked.
In general, these kind of abuses are well known in re-
lation to time-limited demos of software, and there are a
number of ways of making attacks more difficult. Since
a computing device has no inherent way of maintaining
secure time outside of periodic insecure updates from an
external NTP service, these techniques primarily rely on
software watching for unexpected behaviour of the system
clock. If this is detected then access to the protected con-
tent is prevented, although it may be regained if the correct
time can then be confirmed remotely.
Software to detect time-shifting within the OS is typically
protected by code obfuscation and related techniques that
apply a graceful return to a correct clock. While these
may be theoretically bypassed, good techniques exist which
would make this task difficult. Our focus was not so much
the myriad ways of continuing to read content after the
associated RMS policy denies this access. Instead we consid-
ered denial-of-service attacks which use the RMS protection
which would prevent users from getting access to protected
content, even if the RMS system should allow them.
These attacks centered on the fact that the computing
devices on which Azure runs uses SNTP (Simple Network
Time Protocol) to synchronise clients to the master clock.
Windows used this to synchronize systems to their domain
controller, since secure synchronised time over a network
was required for the use of Kerberos within Active Directory
as an authentication protocol. Windows 8 and Windows 10
extended this to all machines, by setting systems to synchro-
nize with time.windows.com if no domain controller is set.
We observed network traffic between a RMS client and
the time synchronisation server. We found that the optional
digital signature of time update packets from the server was
not used. This decision is understandable since the current
standard for authenticated NTP uses symmetric cryptogra-
phy and so would allow any machine able to authenticate
time updates to also spoof them. This situation would be
acceptable where all clients trust every other client and the
server, but not the network, however this is not the case
with all Windows devices.
As expected, by spoofing DNS and directing requests
for time.windows.com to a machine with a SNTP server
under our control allowed us to change the clock on the
client machine. However since the RMS client checks time
on a weekly basis it would be necessary to take control of
the DNS server for a long period of time to change the
clock on a significant number of machines. This would be
a difficult task to do on a large scale since eventually any
attempt to manipulate clocks would be noticed, particularly
if it resulting in IRM stopping working.
In order to amplify this attack we investigated ways for
this attack to be performed either on a shorter scale by
forcing clients to update, or without requiring DNS to be
taken over. Our initial attempt was to flood the network
with broadcast NTP packets.
This did not succeed in changing the time on the clients,
Figure 2: NTP Broadcast Flooding
we believe for two reasons. Firstly it seems that a RMS
machine only listens for time updates for a short period
after it sends out an update request. This only occurs every
7 days by default, so machines are only accepting updates
for a tiny proportion of the time. Secondly while there is no
nonce in NTP packets, the request and reply both include
the current time of the client to millisecond precision. The
Windows implementation of the NTP client only seems to
accept NTP replies with the same client time as it included
in the request and since the lower order bits of this are suffi-
ciently unpredictable, a flood approach unlikely to succeed.
The case of where a RMS machine is part of a domain is
slightly different. According to the Windows Time Service
documentation a MAC key will be negotiated between the
domain controller and the client, and this will be used to
sign NTP update packets. In our tests, we saw NTP pack-
ets sent without MACs however it is not clear whether this
is due to a peculiarity of our domain controller. Addition-
ally we noted that when the RMS client could not contact
the domain controller for NTP updates, it contacted the
DNS server. Both these observations point to the fact that
the RMS client implementation is not based on the design
principle of secure-by-default.
Since in the domain case, time requests are sent to a
machine which then gets updates from time.windows.com,
one opportunity for amplification is to put all resources into
causing the domain controller to have the incorrect time.
We found that this propagates to clients, and so causes
the problems with IRM already mentioned. Furthermore,
the Windows Time service documentation states that if a
client detects it is out of sync with the domain controller
then it will update automatically. We found that by chang-
ing the domain controller time, the time on all clients will
be changed in a short time period by the next update cycle.
To automate this part of the attack, we generated spoofed
Figure 3: Inducing Incorrect Time on Controller
packets in response to NTP packets sent out by the domain
controller purporting to come from the Windows Time
Service (the destination IP being copied from the UDP
request packet). Each spoofed packet carried an offset of
four minutes which was accepted by controller. The default
pollrate set on the domain controller is 4096 seconds, thus
requiring just over a day to induce significant drift.
Defences.
The above DoS attacks depend on the attacker being
able to send spoofed SNTP packets to the RMS client.
Software-Defined Networks (SDN) can help mitigate the
attack by implementing a simple threshold-based approach
– reject any NTP response packets reporting a time offset
approaching the Kerberos ticket expiration time. Unlike
conventional switches, an SDN switches can be programmed
using an SDN controller that manages the control plane
while the switch focuses on fast packet-forwarding. The
controller runs on a server or a desktop computing device.
SDN developers can write programs that secure and au-
tomate routing logic at the core of the network instead of
pushing this work to firewalls installed at the edge of the
network. We experimented with a programmable PICA8
3290 hardware switch that acted as the gateway to an RMS
client (version 2.1) installed on a desktop device running
Windows 10. We programmed the switch using a Ryu
controller to buffer all NTP packets and redirect them to
a switch NTP proxy-server process listening on port 2100.
PICA 3290 is a Linux-based switch hence it is capable
of running Linux binaries, hence exhibiting intelligence as
opposed to a conventional SDN model where all the intel-
ligence resides on the controller. We wrote socket code on
the switch to drop any NTP packets where the combined
values of NTP offset and NTP delay is more than four min-
utes. Five minutes is the threshold beyond which Kerberos
rejects client authentication requests as the tickets expire.
To test the proposed defense, we generated spoofed NTP
packets using the SCAPY tool, purporting to come from the
Windows Time Service. We tested with a range of server
offsets between 30 and 600 seconds. The defense-enabled
SDN switch was able to blackhole NTP packets whose com-
bined offset and delay values were over four minutes with
zero false-positives. Our experiments demonstrate that
it is possible to mitigate attacks using SDN approaches.
However, an attacker can successfully counter our defense
by lowering the threshold of change — by slowly increasing
the NTP offset say at the rate of 30 seconds at each polling
interval. Better statistical approaches might address this
weakness. This will be the subject of future work.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have highlighted the importance of
maintaining secure control of IoT data as it transcends
administrative boundaries. We have examined a popu-
lar approach for achieving this, namely via a cloud-based
rights management service from a prominent software com-
pany. We detail several successful service denial attacks via
tampering the time service on which the digital rights man-
agement depends. We report that the attacks are successful
on every attempt without exception. It is particularly note-
worthy that even if IRM system deployed by RMS is made
fully scalable, Denial-of-Service attacks can be mounted by
local adversaries with very little resources. This is a result
that has important implications — when system safety
is a function of availability, then a DoS attack on data
availability, can escalate into a safety failure, forcing the
operator to engage in an emergency shutdown procedure.
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